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usual structure  of Shakespeares plays is that after  
an expository first act, the three central acts — the
 main body of the play — are given over to dramatic
 representation of the main body of the narrative
 action that constitutes the story and the plot, before
 crisis and resolution are achieved in act 5; thus the
 central portions of King Lear deal with the progres
­sive degeneration of both the Lear and the Glouces
­ter families, those of Hamlet with the Princes
 progress from uncertainty to commitment and with
 the changing fortunes of the Polonius household, and
 those of Macbeth with the period of Macbeths
 unchallenged
 
rule. When it  comes to Othello, howev ­
er, Shakespeare is forced to adopt a rather different
 method, for the simple reason that the events which
 provide the nominal mainspring to drive the plot of
 Othello never in fact take place. Desdemona’s adul
­tery with Cassio, on which all Othello’s 
actions depend, is quite literally a non-event; even if it were
 not, it could never, as Iago so pithily reminds Othel
­lo, be represented on the stage. In its place Shake
­speare must put something else to act as the central
 
busines
s of the play; instead of the representation of  
an act, he offers us the representation of Iago’s story
 of that act — which thus stands, in fact, as the repre
­sentation of
 
a representation. In so doing, he draws  
attention to the fact and effect of performance in
 itself, as well as to its status as mode of representa
­tion, as Iago stages fictive playlets and deploys as his
 props two other ways of mediating the contents of
 the mind to the outside world: things written, and
 things dreamed. As this play of non-events, slippages
1
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and substitutions unfolds, writing, performance and dreamwork will be insis
­






 which is so preeminently about stories should have at its  
heart a story
 
is apt. It could perhaps be said that all of Shakespeare’s plays nec ­
essarily display a strong interest in modes of narration, but what seems to me
 to distinguish Othello from the other works of
 
Shakespeares early and middle  
period is precisely the radical falsity of the rooted belief that most strongly
 informs the hero’s actions. Lear perceives his mistake very early on, and Ham
­let obsessively tests the truth of what he is told, but Othello gives us a central
 character whose view of events is so divorced both from our own and from
 “reality” that he has lent his name to a delusional psychiatric condition, the
 Othello syndrome (see Enoch and Trethowan). 
Even
 here, we may be struck  
by the fact that, unlike Lear or, apparently, Hamlet, Othello is certainly never
 obviously certifiable, leading us to note how delicately the borderlines of a dis
­torted perception are plotted. This emphasis on the idiosyncratic viewpoint
 and its disjunction from external facts is further
 
underlined by the drunkenness  
of Cassio, with its accompanying mood-altering tendencies, and 
his
 equally  
abrupt return to a more normal perspective. To some extent, similar effects may
 be found in other Shakespeare plays with which Othello has strong links: A
 Midsummer
 
Night's Dream, with its magic juices, and two other plays of jeal ­
ousy, The Winters Tale and Cymbeline (jealousy being a condition peculiarly apt
 for the dramatization of belief in the false). In all of these, though, the pres
­ence of a supernatural element and of a comedic teleology allows for the realist
 mode to be overridden by the very different conventions of romance. It is
 uniquely in Othello that modes of representation and narration are systemati
­cally explored exclusively within the confines of the "realist” mode (pace
 Rymer!) and of a theatricality that is 
never




In the case of Othello, the play’s concern with narration has been often
 noticed (see for instance Gardner; Bayley; Sinfield; Bates; Wayne; and Purkiss).
 Mark Thornton Burnett remarks that “in Othello, stories abound and conflict
 with 
each
 other, and the play delineates the attempts of characters to construct  
narratives for themselves which will permit them to understand personal pre
­occupations, to 
replace
 fear with certainty and self-assurance” (62). Thomas  
Moisan comments that “ Othello engages us intertextually in the kinds of narra
­tives, and narrativity, from which it derives its fable” (50), while Stephen
 Greenblatt sees the play’s characteristic process as “submission to narrative self
­fashioning” (234). Patricia
 
Parker also takes this insistence on narrativity as the  
springboard for her telling examination of the function of “dilation” and “dela
­tion” in the play (“Shakespeare and Rhetoric” 54-74; see also Callaghan 61). I
 propose to argue, however, that it is not 
merely
 the fact of narration but the  
modes of narration, and their implications for dramatic representation, on
 which the play centers. In particular, Othello
 
demonstrates a consistent concern  
with speaking, writing, performing, and narrating.
Not only does Othello insistently emphasize the telling of stories, it also
 
shows, in Iago’s case, the means 
by
 which they are concocted, and such means,  
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of full consciousness. The  play itself registers a conspicuous interest in the  
logic and status of the dream as a mode of representation. Unlike A Midsum
­mer Night's Dream, which it may seem to resemble in the extent of this concern,
 Othello has no play-within-the-play; it does, however, offer repeated instances
 of a kind of ventriloquization, by means of
 
which one character co-opts the  
voice of another either innocently or as a technique of 
willful
 misrepresenta ­
tion. Finally, Othello also lacks, unlike Shakespeare’s other tragedies, a scene in
 which the text of a letter is read aloud and glossed; nevertheless, it contains a
 number
 
of packed and allusive images that center precisely on the decoding and  
on the communicative status of written, as opposed to oral, texts. Through
 examination of Shakespeare’s representation of all these representational
 
modes, 
I hope to reflect on the aesthetic experience afforded  by a theatrical per ­
formance of Othello, The play
 may 
encode a sophisticated understanding of the  
problematics of the meaning of meaning, but it can still speak a raw language
 of 
pain. Othello opens with the words “Tush, never tell me” (1.1.1); its closing lines
 are Lodovico’s promise: “Myself will straight abroad, and to the state / This
 heavy act with heavy heart relate” (5.2.371-2). Here the business of narration
 is directly foregrounded, and the impulse to recount offers the only form of
 comfort that seems available to the surviving characters in the face of the
 tragedy that they have witnessed. It is not only in the face of disaster, howev
­er, that characters are moved to tell tales; it is, on most occasions, more or less
 their first impulse. In our first encounter with Iago, he and Roderigo are quite
 literally telling 
tales,
 as they attempt to convince Brabantio that his daughter  
has eloped with Othello. When Othello himself enters, the story that he tells
 of himself to the Senate casts him as the consummate teller of exotic romance
 narratives, as he speaks to Desdemona
 
of “The Anthropophagi, and men whose  
heads / Do 
grow
 beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5). Burnett comments of  
this that “Othello’s story caters to assumptions about his status as a black man
 even as it seems to resist them: it closely resembles contemporary 
accounts
 of  
travels to newly discovered countries” (65).1 There is, however, a curious reluc
­tance on Othello’s part to dwell on the processes of his own storytelling, for he
 actually seeks to render his own narration transparent
 
and to obliterate all traces  
of its mediating 
effect
 on the facts of his life. His offer to the Senate is as fol ­
lows:
And till she come, as faithful as to heaven
I do confess the vices of my blood,
 
So justly to your grave ears I’ll present
 How I did thrive in this fair lady’s love,
 And she in mine. (1.3.122-6)
Othello promises to be both
 
“faithful” and “just” in his recounting, proffering a  
realist narrative in which the action of retelling is in effect a recreating; more
­over, the verb he chooses, “present,” is suggestive more of an acting out than of
 a telling, with an echo of what Moisan has called “the uneasy antiphony the
3
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play negotiates between its narrativity and its theatricality” (68). Othello will
 
in
 effect replay the scene for them, except that in the absence of Desdemona —  
on which this whole interlude depends — he will also take her part.
Having thus secured the attention of his audience, he begins:
Her father lov’d me, oft invited me,
Still questioned 
me
 the story of my life,  
From year to year; the battles, sieges, fortunes,
 That I have pass’d:
I ran it through, even from my boyish days,
To the very moment that he bade 
me
 tell it. (1.3.128-33)
Here the mimetic properties claimed by Othello for his narrative enactment
 
become even more pronounced. Both Moisan and Parker (“Fantasies”) have
 pointed to the intimate relationship between difference and différance in narra
­tive, between dilation and delation; this is precisely what
 
Othello seeks to ignore  
as 
he
 presents his own narrative as transparent and authoritative, not as the  
product of rhetoric
 
or  art. His whole life is summoned  up, its immediacy accen ­
tuated by
 
its striking culmination in the “now” of Brabantio’s command; and its  
truth is implicitly asserted by the starkness with which the potential fictionali-
 ty
 
of “story” is canceled out by the bald claim to factuality of “my life.” The nar ­
rative process itself is not only elided but is, quite literally, figured as a gap, a
 moment of non-existence: Othello’s life
 
to date stops at the moment when  Bra-  
bantio bids him recount it, not at the moment when he had actually recounted
 
it.
 It is odd that storytelling, in many ways the key activity of Othello’s life, is  
thus apparently not counted 
by
 him as a part of that life at all — although to  
recount the story
 
of the  whole of it  must,  presumably, have occupied quite some  
time. In this play in which the relationship of events to time is so thoroughly
 problematized, this is perhaps the most 
remarkable
 piece of temporal legerde ­
main of all. There is a slippage here that is further emphasized 
by
 the fact that  
Othello’s invitation to Desdemona to “witness it” (1.3.169) coincides, literally,
 with her entrance: she is asked to attest to the truth of an account she has not
 heard, and this seems to arise not so much from any bad faith on Othello’s part
 as from his blindness to the processes of narrative that differentiate his verbal
 reconstruction from, the event itself, at which Desdemona has indeed been pre
­sent and to which she could, therefore, witness.
What of the story
 
itself? Is it really true, or, more importantly, since noth ­
ing in a play is, in one sense, true, would its various audiences have considered
 it to 
be
 so? It seems to me to be important in two major aspects: what it does  
say, and what it does not. It reveals strikingly little of either of those two pri
­mary demarcators of people 
(arguably
 in most circumstances, but overwhelm ­
ingly in Shakespeare’s Venice), class or
 
race background;  it  offers no clues about  
motivation. Instead, its primary
 
function is to depict the exoticism and dangers  
of his travels, and Othello attributes its spectacular success in winning over
 Desdemona’s affections to its fulfillment of this aim. This is certainly stirring
 stuff: a mere summary of it moves the Duke to comment, “I think this tale
 would win my daughter too” (1.3.171). Is it plausible, though? The Arden edi
­
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tor comments of the Anthropophagi and the “men whose heads / Do grow
 
beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5) that “such travellers’ tales were current,
 and it seems as idle as the deserts to try
 
to determine whether Shakespeare  was  
primarily
 
indebted to Mandeville or Raleigh or Holland’s Pliny.” Parker, how ­
ever, remarks that “Othello’s "dilated’ traveler’s tale recalls Africanus, Mandev
­ille, Pliny, and the rest” (“Fantasies” 98), all of whose veracity was much in
 doubt, and Jyotsna Singh describes Othello’s “stories of slavery and adventure”
 as featuring him as “a character’ in an imaginary landscape which viewers, then
 and now, recognize as a semi-fictional creation of colonialist travel narratives”
 (288).
Part of the attraction of “travellers’ tales” is surely
 
their overt improbability,  
and an age with a growing interest in anatomy and medicine might well be
 skeptical of men with heads beneath their 
shoulders.
 In this case, the lack of  
immediacy of this narration of a narrative is further figured by Othello’s tauto
­logical replacement of the word “cannibal” with “anthropophagi.” Cannibal,
 which seems in anagrammatized form to have provided the origin of Caliban’s
 name, perhaps functions as an isolated relic of the native speech of which we
 hear so little in Othello; its replacement by the classical term “anthropophagi”
 thus symbolizes not
 
only Othello’s learning but also the firmness  with which  he  
is inserted into pre-existing discourses of travel that must radically inform and
 structure his ostensibly experiential
 
account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his  
story, it in fact 
tells
 him, but he is as blind to its constitutive structures as he is  
to the narrative constraints that make the telling of the story as much a part of
 the chronological history
 
of his life as the experience of it is. Othello, in short,  
thinks narration is a transparent mode, as he demonstrates again when he
 claims simply that “My parts, my title, and 
my
 perfect  soul, / Shall manifest me  
rightl ” (1.2.31-2) and that “My services, which I have done the signiory, /
 Shall out-tongue 
his
 complaints” (1.2.18-19). What Shakespeare’s representa ­
tion of narration shows the audience, however, is that narration is always
 already a representation that in fact 
remakes
 itself with each re-presentation.
Such 
consciousness
 of fictionality never  features in Othello’s account,  but it  
is perhaps appropriate that Desdemona’s immediate response to 
his
 story is to  




And bade me, if I had a friend that lov’d her,
 I should but teach him how to tell 
my
 story,  
And that
 
would woo her. (1.3.163-6)
Desdemona here seems clearly aware that the concoction of a fiction can be a
 
useful
 mechanism for the direct manipulation of reality: upon this hint, Oth ­
ello spake. It 
may
 well seem ominous that Othello here can register the dis ­
guised truth of Desdemona’s story, recognizing it as a “hint” and as referring to
 himself and to her rather than to the putative “friend,” but that he can show no
 awareness of 
his
 own imbrication in similar tactical  ploys: implicitly, he already  
assumes mendacity in her and truth in himself. Ironically, though, Desde
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from experience, a cut-and-dried rerun of it, but in com ­
plex and mutually formative interplay with it. The story that Othello has told
 of his life has resulted in a change to the story that, in the future, he will tell of
 it (as we see in act 5 when his anecdote of the killing of the Turk 
takes
 on new  
symbolic meaning when applied to his present circumstances); once again, the
 stress is on the materiality and the consequentiality not only of the narration
 but of the lived (or, on the Shakespearean 
stage,
 represented) moment of its  
representation. For Othello, though, essence and representation are consistent
­ly figured as fused. His attitude, and its difference from that prevalent in
 Venice, is perhaps best encapsulated in two paired moments in act 1, scene 3.
 When the First Senator is told that the
 
Turks are heading for Rhodes, he dis ­
misses the news with “’tis a pageant, / To keep us in false gaze” (1.3.18-19);
 when Othello
'
s followers draw in his defense, he rebukes them as follows:  
“Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it, / Without a prompter”
 (1.2.83-4). The supersubtle Venetian senator plays with the discourse of the
­atricality, which he casts as inherently deceptive, but Othello draws no distinc
­tion between 
his
 own internalized behavior and the externalized fictionality of  
the stage, and registers no consciousness of the kind of perceptional fallacy that
 is so obvious to the Senator. It is in the same 
vein
 that he will later command  
Iago, “if thou dost love me, / Show 
me
 thy thought” (3.3.119-20).
Othello’s absolute faith in the reliability of his own story as a transparent
 mediator of his experiences clearly prepares him all too well for 
his
 role as the  
dupe of Iago. From the outset of
 
the play, Iago exhibits a sustained concern  
with modes of narration, persuasion, and figuring, both to oneself and to oth
­ers. Suggestively, he registers an 
early
 awareness of a mechanism for self-nar ­
ration of which he will later make very telling use, the dream: he assures
 Roderigo,
 
“If ever I did dream of such a matter,  / Abhor me” (1.1.5-6). He also  
mounts a miniature play-within-the-play in 
his
 use of inset dialogue to charac ­
terize (and presumably, in performance, to “impersonate”) Othello:
But 
he,
 as loving his own pride and purposes,
Evades them, with a bombast circumstance,




 mediators: for “Certes,” says he,  
“I have already chosen my officer.” (1.1.12-17)
Strikingly, Iago also refers to his own preferred method of communicating
 
information: he feels that Othello should have promoted him on the grounds
 of sure personal knowledge, referring to himself as “I, of whom his eyes had
 
seen
 the proof” (1.1.28). For all his later brilliance as a manipulative stage  
manager of the various representational strategies through which he will
 deceive Othello, and for all the sophistication in hermeneutics that leads him
 to explain to Othello the impossibility of
 
ocular proof, it is precisely on such  
proof that his own claim is based. As the word “proof” re-echoes throughout
 the later part
 
of the play (we hear it at  3.3.194-5,200,436,448, and, as “prove,”  
at 5.1.66), we 
may
 recall this ur-investigation of its problematics.
6





s inability  to prove even by  proof is radically symptomatic of the prob ­
lem he experiences in the early part of this scene. Although what he is telling
 Brabantio is true, he cannot initially get him to believe it — an ironic contrast
 with the ease with which he will later persuade Othello of a lie. The break
­through, suggestively, involves a recurrence of the dream motif, as Brabantio
 moves from incredulity to declaring, “This accident is not unlike my dream, /
 Belief of it oppresses 
me
 already” (1.1.142-3). This prefigures Iago’s later fab ­
rication of a dream sequence involving Cassio, and it also exemplifies his most
 successful strategy of inducing his victim to internalize the persuasion. Inter
­estingly, a later comment of Iago’s is similarly prophetic: “I must show out a
 flag, and sign of love, / Which is indeed but sign” (1.1.156-7). This not only
 plays grimly on his own role as Othello’s flag-bearer; it 
equally
 affords an iron ­
ic prolepsis of his later co-optation of the handkerchief as literal
 
“flag, and sign  
of love.” Throughout the 
early
 stages of the play, Shakespeare lays great stress  
on the provisionality
 
of Iago’s plan, and on the processes of its formation “A  
double knavery ... how, how? ... let me see” (1.3.392). To see the later devel
­opments of the scheme foreshadowed here may 
well
 be to glimpse Shake ­
speare’s representation of
 
something akin to dreamwork taking place in Iago s  
mental processes, and certainly this is echoed in the way Iago himself figures
 the progress of his strategy: “If consequence do but approve my dream, / My
 boat sails freely, both with wind and stream” (2.3.58-9). To some extent, the
 unfolding action of Othello does indeed reflect Iago’s dream
 
—  or  Iago’s night ­
mare — come true.
In 
itself,
 and as it forms the main business of both Iago’s plot and Shake ­
speare’s, Iago’s story is as circumstantial as Othello’s own, and it is no more
 inherently improbable: indeed Coppélia Kahn argues that Iago himself effec
­tively comes to believe it (143). Like Othello “presenting” his story to the sen
­ate, Iago too cements his narrative structure with carefully staged playlets:
 Cassio handing the stolen handkerchief to Bianca, Cassio drunk and fighting,
 Iago offering us his little vignette of Cassio’s dream. In this last instance, Iago
 functions as a double of Othello’s own performative style: just as Othello acts
 out Desdemona’s part in her absence from the senate meeting, so Iago plays
 Cassio’s role for him. In both cases the role of the subsidiary actor is ventrilo
­quized: fictionally, we are offered their voices, but factually they are silent.
 Although it has no formal play-within-the-play, Othello
'
s exploration of the ­
atricality repeatedly offers such moments of characters playing
 
each other, from  
Iago’s quotation of Othello’s promotion of Cassio to the Duke’s highly sugges
­tive words to Brabantio, “Let me speak like yourself” 
(1.3.199);
 Iago will pro ­
duce another such moment of role-slippage when he labels women “Players 
in your housewifery; and housewives in your beds” (2.1.112), and Othello makes
 perhaps the most poignant use of the motif when he 
firsts
 casts Emilia as a  
bawd (4.2.28-30) and then, ironically, pretends to misrecognize Desdemona as
 not being the whore that, in fact, she is not (90-2). It is this technique that
 will later allow Iago to attempt the incrimination of Bianca by a similar ven-
 triloquization, this time involving the language of the body: “Stay you, good
 gentlewoman; look you pale, mistress? / Do you perceive the gestures of her
 eye?” (5.1.104-5). Finally, the ultimate act of ventriloquization will also be the
7
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most poignant: Emilia, on her deathbed, will imitate Desdemona as she
 
resolves, “I will play the swan, / And die in music: [Singing] Willow, willow,
 willow" (5.2.248-9). Emilia, unlike her husband, does not mean to deceive
 here; but both she and 
we
 are well awar  of the precise status of this moment  
as re-presentation, since it is precisely from that quality that it takes its affec
­tive force.
Iago’s relation to Cassio, though, is more sustained than any of these other
 
examples of impersonation. In all of Iagos stage-managed 
episodes,
 Cassio is  
allotted a part, and Cassio
'
s promotion is the reason for Iago 's initial discon ­
tent: Iago sees Cassio in the role he had coveted for himself. Iago and Cassio
 are doubled in other ways. Famously, they twice offer closely juxtaposed and
 completely antithetical views of Desdemona: Cassio blazons her to the Cypri
­
ots
 (2.1.65), whereas Iago is “nothing, if not critical” (119), and their respons ­
es to the withdrawal of Desdemona and Othello 
for
 their wedding night are  
similarly counterpointed, Cassio seeing purity and Iago lust (2.3.15-25).
 Equally, though Cassio’s lament for lost reputation is soon echoed
 
by Iago 's dis ­
quisition on good name (3.3.159-65), contrasts of dramatic context and rhetor
­ical style make for a very different effect. Just as the substance of their speech
 is different, so is there a marked difference in the way they are received as
 tellers of stories. Whereas Iago
'
s messages are, initially at least, habitually dis ­
regarded, Cassio
'
s are avidly received, and he is repeatedly turned  to as an infor ­
mant of authority. When we first encounter him, Othello immediately asks
 him, “What is the news?” 
(1.2.36)
 and follows it up two lines later with,  
“What’s the matter, think you?” (38). Arriving in Cyprus, Desdemona greets
 him with “I thank you, valiant Cassio; / What tidings can you tell me of my
 lord?” (2.1.87-8).
Most notable in this respect is the description of Cassio’s own arrival on the
 
island, which immediately follows the Third Gentleman’s assurance that the
Turkish fleet is destroyed:
Mon. How, is this true?
Third Gent.
 
The ship is here put in,
A Veronesa; Michael Cassio,
Lieutenant to the warlike Moor Othello,
Is come ashore: the Moor himself at sea,
 
And in full commission here for Cyprus.
 Mon, I am 
glad
 on’t, ’tis a worthy governor.  
Third Gent, But this same Cassio, though he speak of comfort,
 Touching the Turkish loss, yet he looks sadly,
 And prays the Moor be safe, for they
 
were parted,  
With 
foul
 and violent tempest. (2.1.25-34)
The Arden edition prints “How, is this true?”; but it would be just as apposite
 
to read “How is this true?” because that is what
 
the  passage is substantially con ­
cerned with. The precise mechanism of the transmission of this information is
 
never
 uncovered (it cannot be “the ship” that speaks the message), but it is  
amply suggested by the introduction of Cassio’s name followed by the idea of
 
8
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 sees, tells, and is believed, and nothing occurs  
later in the 
play
 to undermine the substance of his report. There are other  
echoes of this sane world: Desdemona wants the Clown to “[b]e edified by
 report” (3.4.12), and Emilias imagined story about the putative storyteller who
 has slandered Desdemona is, ironically, true. Equally, Bianca, despite the fact
 that she is told so little, manages usually
 
to get a pretty accurate idea of what is  
going on through conjecture. Perhaps to some extent these moments of sim
­plified decoding provide the same kinds of respite from tension as is supplied
 in other tragedies by comic relief, of which there is so noticeably little in Oth
­ello. Perhaps they afford us instead a sort of epistemological relief, though one
 that only makes more poignant our understanding of the machinations of Iago.
Iago
'
s own approach to the transmission — or in his case to the distorting  
— of information is clearly characterized. He is himself a remarkably insensi
­
tive
 reader of situations, believing Emilia to be likely to commit adultery  with  
both Othello and Cassio, believing Cassio to be in love with Desdemona,
 believing it possible that she might return the affection. Emilias word for his
 
wis
hes is, interestingly, “fantasy” (3.3.303). His recapitulations, in particular,  
are crude, albeit inflected for the benefit of Roderigo: “with what
 
violence she  
first lov’
d
 the Moor, but for bragging, and telling her fantastical lies” (2.1.221-  
2);
 
“Lechery, by this hand: an index and prologue to the history of lust and foul  
thoughts” (254-5). Iago’s initial problem, seen from 
his
 own perspective, is no  
small one: a man whose announcements are rarely heeded must try to weave a
 convincing story whose success will depend entirely
 
on people acting in certain  
ways that are, in fact, against their own interest. His first attempt at producing
 such a narrative
 
is particularly fraught, since he must  retell the story of the fight  
between Montano and Cassio, in the presence of both, in a
 
way that while not  
seeming directly to incriminate Cassio will actually have precisely that effect;
 and 
he
 must, moreover, avoid being caught  out in any of the lies he has told. In  
this last consideration, he sails particularly close to the wind. He tells Othello
 that he heard “Cassio high 
in
 oaths, which till to-night / I ne’ er might see  
before” (2.3.226-7), and he thus comes dangerously close to contradicting his
 earlier assertion to Montano that Cassio’s drunkenness is habitual. In fact,
 though, to focus exclusively on 
swearing
 allows him to deflect attention com ­
pletely from the problematic issue of the frequency of Cassio’s drinking, and his
 re-presentation of the affair has precisely the effects that he desires. Later, he
 will use a similar strategy when he deliberately makes his interlude
 
with Cassio  
a dumbshow, an archaic mode of representation in theatrical terms but
 
the only  
one that will do duty 
here.
 It  is particularly ironic that this is overtly framed in 
terms that hint at its fictionality: Iago opens the episode
 
with, “For I will make  
him tell the tale anew” 
(4.1.84),
and Othello comments aside, "Iago beckons  
me, now 
he
 begins the story” (130); but Othello’s uncritical attitude towards his  
own storytelling prevents him from perceiving the re-presented nature of even
 so crude and unrealistic (in metatheatrical terms) a device as the dumbshow.
The crucial role in Iago’s story is of course that of Desdemona, but since she
 
continually refuses to play it for him, Iago has to resort to an overt declaration
 of the unstageability of certain parts of his narrative:
9





 a tedious difficulty, I think,
To bring ’em to that prospect, damn ’em then,
If ever mortal eyes did see them bolster
More than their own; what then, how then?
What shall I say? where’s satisfaction?
It is impossible you should see this .. . (3.3.403-8)
This is 
an
 aesthetic strange to Othello, who is unused to the notion that any  
experience, however arcane, whether of slavery or of anthropophagi, cannot be
 summoned up for the imagination of the 
auditor.
 Iago, as his inability to con ­
vince Brabantio in the first scene showed, is a poorer narrator and stager than
 Othello, despite — or perhaps 
because
 of— his far more sophisticated  
approach to the problematics of representation. But his approach works
 because he is able to 
effect
 a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative  
expectation. Initially, Othello adheres to his own ideas of the entire trans
­parency of representational systems: he adjures Iago to "give the worst of
 thought / The worst of word” (136-7); he complains:
Thou dost conspire against thy friend, Iago,
If thou but thinkest him wrong’d, and makest his ear
A stranger to thy thoughts. (146-8)
Once again, Othello shows no consciousness whatsoever of
 
the mechanics of  
representation: 
for




 sets to  work on these ideas, however. It  is remarkable how much  
of his attack on Othello consists not in the providing of evidence but in
 instructing his victim 
in
 new ways of interpreting evidence. When Othello  
demands, “give me the ocular proof” (3.3.366), Iago explains patiently, “It is
 impossible you should see this” (408). He amazes Othello
 
by telling him of the  
alleged representational code of Venice: “their best conscience / Is not to leave
 undone, but keep unknown” (207-8). Othello, whose very identity
 
is so exten ­
sively predicated on narration, responds in appalled fascination: “Dost thou say
 so?” (209) — a reply that ironically 
encodes
 the very problematics of represen ­
tation that it discounts, since the fact that Iago says so does not make it true.
 Iago continues in this 
vein,
 repeatedly stressing an aesthetics of concealment:
Alas, alas!
It is not honesty in me to 
speak
What I have seen and known . . . (4.1.272-4)
And Othello is convinced. The man who earlier in the play is presented to us
 
as the consummate narrator, and who has earlier demanded with such vehe
­mence an accurate account of the origins of the brawl, begins to veer towards
 silence:
I should make very forges of my cheeks,
That
 
would to cinders burn up modesty,
Did I but 
speak
 thy deeds. (4.2.76-8)
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This is the effect of Iago
'
s doctrine of the dangers of re-presentation, and it is  
potent indeed: Othello, the worker with words, will not use them now, and it
 is actually his refusal
 
to make any more specific accusation than this that so rad ­
ically disempowers Desdemona, since she can make no detailed rebuttal.




 he not only  feeds Othello false information but  radically  conditions  
his mechanisms for responding to it. Left alone, Othello mutters, “This hon
­est creature doubtless / Sees and knows more, much more, than he unfolds”
 (3.3.246-7). Most terribly of all, this new belief
 
in the power of  the hidden  
does not completely
override
 his earlier faith in the transparency of narration,  
but rather fuses with it. When Iago, mock-deprecatingly, asks, “Will you think
 so?”, he replies at once, “Think so, Iago?” 
(4.1.1),
 suggesting that though the  
Moor has lost faith in signifying systems, he remains 
paradoxically
 and dan ­
gerously adamant about his own ability to decode them: even if everything
 Desdemona
 
says to him is a lie, he can know the truth about  her. He  is, we rec ­
ognize, caught up in the epistemological impasse of the Cretan paradox.
As for Desdemona herself, she remains blissfully 
unaware
 even of what  
story she has been cast in. This is revealed by
 
her dogged persistence in plead ­
ing for Cassio and in refusing to believe that her husband 
could
 be jealous of  
her. In this respect, she may well seem to play into Iago’s hands; certainly, in
 the stories that they have told of her, critics have frequently constructed her as
 naive, even irritating, in this part of the play. Equally, however, Desdemonas
 actions can be seen as arising from a total lack of awareness of the role script
­
ed
 for her  by both Othello and Iago. What she discovers is that even when she  
is physically present on the stage and apparently controlling her own behavior,
 she is still subject to ventriloquization through the interpretative strategies
 applied to her by others. When she does finally learn this, her response is 
an apt one in this play structured by narratives, for she too tells a story: displac
­ing her own anxieties into the safely distanced world of fiction, in a classic nar
­rative strategy, she tells the tale-within-the-tale of Barbary, her mother’s maid,
 who at a time of grief herself fell back on the recounting of stories as she sang
 the “song of willow” that, though
 
“an old  thing,” “express’ d her  fortune” (4.4.28-  
9). This bedchamber scene that
 
shows us Desdemona and Emilia alone togeth ­
er is ostensibly colored by an atmosphere of intimacy, but actually it is largely
 structured by absences and silences, as Desdemona, instead of revealing to us
 her own innermost thoughts, tells us a story of a woman who told a story. As
 such, it can be taken to stand for all the stories in Othello that have a hollow
­ness at their heart, as is so strikingly figured 
by
 the imaginary nature of the  
adultery that 
forms
 the very kernel of the play.
The most striking gap in any story in the play is perhaps that in Iago’s.
 Famously, critics have been consistently unconvinced that the motivation that
 Iago himself describes is sufficient to actuate the levels of malice that he
 demonstrates. What is his hidden agenda, the 
secret
 self that he never reveals  
to us, what is his “dream” and his “fantasy”? To plug this gap, critics have
 offered stories of their own, reading Iago as anything from disgruntled 
soldier to repressed homosexual. On one level, it is arguable that this is because his
 part is in fact underwritten. But I would like to suggest that it may be 
precise­ly the secret of Shakespeare’s success, of his universally acknowledged “great
­ness,”
 
that he habitually underwrites roles, and  indeed whole  plays, in ways that
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provide immense stimulation to audience involvement and imagination. Iago
 
is perhaps merely the most striking example of the phenomenon. Equally, his
 opacity may serve as 
an
 important corrective to Othello's own aesthetic of the  
transparency of narrative by reminding us of the inherent difficulties involved
 in all decoding. In an ultimate irony Iago, whose stories and whose ventrilo
­quized playlets we know we must disbelieve, thus nevertheless becomes the
 most reliable voice to guide us in the proper interpretation of our own experi
­ences of stage representation.
The 
difficulties
 of decoding are most strikingly figured at the very end of  
the 
play
 in a tale  by  that most innocent  of tellers, Othello himself. Othello, fit ­
tingly, chooses to 
die
 as he has lived, recounting a story:
Set you down this,
And say 
besides,
 that in Aleppo once,  
Where a malignant and a turban’d Turk
 Beat a Venetian, and traduc’
d
 the state,  
I took by the throat the circumcised dog,
 And smote him thus. [Stabs
 
himself.] (5.2.352-7)
This is a story that obviously means a lot to Othello: he dies uttering
 
it, giving  
it the talismanic force habitually attached to last words, and he is anxious that
 those hearing it should, in their turns, recount it. It is, however, unclear how
 exactly this relation relates to him. Initially, Othello is the hero of his own
 tales: has he now become the villain? Both the "I" and the “him” of the story
 (suggestively echoing Desdemona’s earlier and more sophisticated comment
 that “I do beguile / The thing I am by seeming otherwise” [2.1.122-3]), he is
 himself both Turk and not-Turk, subject and object of his own narration. Per
­haps, however, even to think in such terms is
 
in itself to commit one of the most  
common (though at the same time 
one
 of  the least, if  at all, avoidable) of  all  
interpretative errors: to 
read
 the self into the text. On a thematic and psycho ­
logical level, of course, it obviously
 
is a roman à clef; I am not saying that  I can ­
not see the extraordinary symbolic force of having Othello at this crucial
 moment presented to us as that most demonized of others, the Turk. Mention
 of Turks may also, however, remind us of their abrupt disappearance from the
 narrative (if not the thematic) structure of the play at the opening of act 2,
 when all the narrative competence we possess encouraged us to expect them to
 form a major part of the story. It thus underlines the problematics and con
­taining structures of the narrative mode itself.
This reminder that we ourselves have, during the course of the play, expe
­
rienced problems with the decoding of narrative may serve to concentrate our
 minds on the interpretative processes of Othello himself, and in particular to
 make us aware of the delicately drawn relation between Othello as narrator and
 Othello as hearer. The logic of his account to the senate implies a stress on the
 presentness of representation, rather than on the element of re-presenting,
 which
 
would allow for the introduction of difference. When he himself is told  
a story by Iago, though, he focuses instinctively on precisely those elements of
 the narrative that allow for the maximum flexibility of reader response and,
 ostensibly at 
least,
 for greatest interpretative leeway. Repeatedly, he imposes  
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his own guilt-based reading over the possibilities of innocence that Iago pre
­
tends to hold out to him. Iago
'
s narrative, then, is for Othello both an accurate  
representation — a transparent account of events — and, simultaneously, a re
­presentation, a version of events offered by an inaccurate narrator whose poor
 
readings
 must be erased in favor of those supplied by Othello himself. Though  
uncritical as narrator and spectator, Othello does, in many ways, pride himself
 on his performance as close reader.
The “reading” element of the interchanges between Iago an
d
 Othello is  
interestingly imaged at several points. One such passage is perhaps the most
 famous in the play, and as such may 
well
 be taken rather for  granted: but when  
Iago declares that “trifles light as air / Are to the jealous, confirmations strong
 / As proofs of holy writ” (3.3.327-9), we should, I think, be particularly atten
­tive to the implied comparison between the suggestions he has been making to
 Othello and a written text. This is made especially pointed if we take “proofs”
 as meaning not only
 
“evidence” but “page proofs,” a usage first recorded by the  
OED in 1563 and with recorded occurrences also in 1600, 1612 and 1613. In
 a rather similar vein, Othello refers to Iago
'
s mutterings as “close denotements”  
(3.3.127), and the idea of “note” there is precisely what Iago repeatedly invites
 Othello to do. This is a play that, uniquely among Shakespeare’s “great”
 tragedies, has no written text-within-the-text. No letter is read out on stage
 and glossed, as they are by Claudius, Gloucester and Lady Macbeth, and Iago
 suggestively refers to Othello’s “unbookish jealousy” (4.1.101). However, Iago
 holds out the alleged relationship
 
between Desdemona and Cassio as a  text that  
he himself has lightly annotated but that obviously requires much more exten
­sive marginalia, and these Othello is only too happy to supply, as the two join
 
each
 other in a happy game of glossing and outglossing in which Desdemona  
is the
 
“most goodly book” “to write 'whore’ on” (4.2.73-4). The  proofs are, after  
all, only at proof stage; they still need to be corrected, and Othello can emend
 them to what he pleases.
It is at the close of the play that the emphasis on its textuality is most
 
marked, as Lodovico laments, “O bloody period!” (5.2.358) with its connota
­tion of the literal, printed full stop. Interestingly, Gratiano’s response to this is
 that “All that’s spoke is marr’d.” As much as anywhere in the play, it is 
in
 this  
final scene that the dynamics and problematics of narration, representation and
 ocular proof
 
find incisive exploration. When Othello, in a potentially highly  
bizarre moment, looks towards Iago’s, feet and finds them 
uncloven,
 he seems  
finally to have accepted the possibility that a story may be 
merely
 a “fable”  
(5.2.287); but only a few lines later his aesthetics of inalienably accurate repre ­
sentation is back in 
place
 as he implores, “I pray you in your letters, / When you  
shall these unlucky deeds relate, / Speak of them as they are” (341-3). This in
 itself has a double-edged force: on the one hand, it returns to the misleading
 and mutually contradictory letters reporting the Turkish campaign against the
 
Venet
ians, but on the other  it chimes with the letters found on Roderigo’s body  
(309-19), which have proved potent instruments to reveal the truth. “Proof”
 has, at 
last,
 come forth, and it is in the written text that it has surfaced.
The logic of Othello’s own proof-readings is clear enough. As readers are
 so often
 
tempted  to do,  he construes the story as centered on himself— as Des-
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demona implicitly does with
 
the tale of Barbary, and as Barbary in turn did with  
the 'old song”
 
which,  both to her and to Desdemona,  "express’d her fortune” —  
so that, for him, even an exchange between Cassio and Bianca 
becomes
 a story  
about himself and Desdemona. This is, of course, to say little more than that
 everyone reads from his or her own highly particularized subject position 
and that readers are frequently likely to make an immense emotional investment in
 works that have, objectively viewed, nothing whatsoever to do with their own
 lives, as can easily be illustrated by the common reaction to films of books that
 "he doesn’t look anything
 
like Heathcliff/Rhett  Butler/Mr. Darcy” In one way,  
this is precisely the key to the secret of Iago’s success with Othello, since it is
 
by
 his omissions that  he gets Othello interested enough  in his narrative of Des ­
demona’s supposed infidelity to make the Moor wish to fill in the gaps by his
 own imaginative engagement with them. Writing ourselves into films, books,
 and plays, we constitute a fantasy out of a narrative in ways very closely analo
­gous to Iago’s Hamlet-like "interpreter” role for the script elements with
 
which  
the actions of Desdemona and Cassio supply him.
Othello, though, 
may
 operate rather differently. Michael D. Bristol, com ­
menting on the story of the spectator who shot dead the actor playing Othello
 to stop a
 
black man from killing a white woman, notes that "[g]iven the painful  
nature of the story, the history of both the interpretation and the performance
 of Othello have been characterized by a search for anesthetic explanations that
 allow the show to go on” (79). If Bristol
 
is right, does the demand for  the anes ­
thetic 
actually
 foreclose our response to the aesthetic pleasures of the text?  
Rowland Wymer, discussing Webster and Ford, has recently commented that
 "[m]odern 
academic
 criticism, in its concern with meaning and contextualiza-  
tion, has often given an inadequate account of the experience provided by works
 of art,” and he goes on to quote Susan Sontag’s insistence that “[in] place of a
 hermeneutics we need 
an
 erotics of art” (Wymer 104). Perhaps our own high ­
ly tuned interpretative 
abilities,
 consistently trained to the making of meanings,  
tend to blind us to the possibility that at the heart of Othello lies an exposure
 both of the indeterminacy and opacity at the heart of all narratives and of the
 problematics of our own responses to them,2 as the play insistently underlines
 in its repeated emphasis on both the
 
hermeneutics and  the erotics of enactment,  
reenactment, narration and representation. It is only in the re-presentation of
 Othello — in the temporally conditioned, imaginatively engaged process of
 responding to the actors’ own engagement
 
with it in the theater — that  we re ­
experience the quality of the play’s exploration of the dynamics of narration  
staged. Throughout the play, we are made powerfully aware of that urgent  
imperative that underlies the triple-layered use of the Willow Song, expression:
 "an old thing ’twas, but it express’
d
 her fortune.” Characters in Othello tend on  
the whole to 
be
 bad at explaining — both Cassio and Desdemona fail spectac­
ularly at it — but they are good at expressing. Every time that the play is per
­formed, they are given a rich and full opportunity
 
to do s , which, as the play’s  
own use of reading metaphors reminds us, touches us in ways distinct from the
 experience of reading.
14






See Cheadle for the interesting suggestion that “the reference to the  
anthropophagi 
could
 . . . even figure as Othellos most apposite rebuke of the  
man who has proved credulous in being prepared to believe in fabulous crea
­tures no less than love charms” (492).
2.
 
In the case of Othello, the norms of critical response have in fact been  
distorted 
by
 what Rochelle Smith terms “the tendency of Othello criticism to  
mirror the perspectives of the play
'
s main characters.” She cites various exam ­
ples of this tendency (311).
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